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Judicial	 Power	 and	U.S.	 Foreign	 Affairs	 for	 their	 valuable	 feedback	 on	 the	 remarks	 that	
formed	 the	 basis	 of	 this	 Essay.	 I	 also	 thank	 the	 editors	 and	 staff	 of	 the	 Fordham	








play	 in	 the	 conduct	 of	 the	 nation’s	 foreign	 affairs	 or	 the	 precise	
relationship	 between	 the	 judiciary’s	 powers	 and	 those	 of	 the	
Legislative	and	Executive	Departments.	In	this	respect,	the	textual	
specification	 of	 the	 judiciary’s	 powers	 over	 foreign	 affairs,	 like	
those	 describing	 the	 powers	 of	 the	 President	 and	 Congress,	
conform	to	Professor	Edward	Corwin’s	famous	description	of	the	
Constitution	 as	 “an	 invitation	 to	 struggle	 for	 the	 privilege	 of	
directing	American	foreign	policy.”2		
But	 as	 Professor	 Martin	 Flaherty	 demonstrates	 in	 his	
impressive	 new	 book, 3 	the	 modern	 Supreme	 Court	 has	 shown	
relatively	little	interest	in	asserting	itself	in	this	struggle.	Instead,	
the	 Court	 has	 taken	 a	 variety	 of	 steps	 that	 have	 limited	 its	
involvement	 in	 international	affairs	and	 largely	acquiesced	 in	an	
expansive	 conception	 of	 presidential	 power	 that	 limits	 the	
circumstances	 in	 which	 it	 must	 step	 in	 to	 police	 the	 boundary	
separating	 presidential	 power	 from	 congressional	 power. 4	




There	 is	 a	 great	 deal	 to	 admire	 in	 Professor	 Flaherty’s	




controversies	 than	does	 the	modern	 judiciary	 actively	 enforcing	












practical	 significance	 of	 the	 judiciary’s	 role	 in	 foreign	 affairs	
throughout	 the	 eighteenth,	 nineteenth,	 and	 early	 twentieth	
centuries,	there	seems	little	basis	for	doubting	that	modern	cases	
suggest	 a	 substantially	 diminished	 role	 for	 the	 judiciary	 in	 this	
particular	category	of	legal	questions.7	




connects	 the	 interpretive	 power	 and	 authority	 of	 the	 Article	 III	
federal	 courts	 to	 those	 courts’	 more	 fundamental	 duty	 to	
accurately	apply	the	underlying	substantive	law	to	the	particular	
cases	and	controversies	that	are	brought	within	their	jurisdiction.	
When	 assessed	 from	 this	 perspective,	 straightforward	
comparisons	of	 judicial	“role”	at	different	points	 in	US	history	of	













nineteenth	 and	 early	 twentieth	 centuries,	 (2.)	 the	United	 States’	
enhanced	engagement	with	multilateral	human	rights	treaties	and	
the	corresponding	increase	in	treaty	reservations	during	the	mid-
twentieth	 century,	 and	 (3.)	 the	 shift	 in	 the	 conceptual	
underpinnings	 of	 the	 statutory	 presumption	 against	










the	 claims	 asserted	 in	 this	 essay	 are	 conceptual,	 rather	 than	
empirical	in	nature	and	thus	should	not	be	understood	as	staking	
out	 any	 strong	 claims	 about	 the	 content	 of	 existing	 law	 or	 the	
relationship	between	existing	law	and	the	law	that	predominated	
during	any	particular	earlier	period.	 	 Second,	 it	may	be	 the	case	
that	 constitutional	 questions	 reflect	 additional	 interpretive	
challenges	in	assessing	the	judiciary’s	proper	“role”	and	that	such	
distinctive	 challenges	 are	not	 fully	 accounted	 for	by	 the	present	
observations.	 	 Finally,	 the	 conception	 of	 “judicial	 role”	 that	
provides	 the	 central	 framing	 device	 for	 this	 Essay	 may	 not	 be	
appropriate	for	non-judicial	actors	in	our	constitutional	system.	
I.	JUDICIAL	POWER	AND	JUDICIAL	DUTY	








is.”8 	Less	 often	 quoted	 are	 the	 two	 sentences	 that	 immediately	
follow	Marshall’s	famous	aphorism:	“Those	who	apply	the	rule	to	
particular	 cases	 must,	 of	 necessity,	 expound	 and	 interpret	 that	
rule.	If	two	laws	conflict	with	each	other,	the	Courts	must	decide	
on	 the	 operation	 of	 each.” 9 	In	 other	 words,	 the	 foundation	 of	
judicial	 power—including	 the	 much	 vaunted	 power	 of	 “judicial	
review”—is	 characterized	as	derivative	of,	 and	 contingent	upon,	
the	judiciary’s	more	fundamental	duty	to	apply	existing	law	to	the	














judicial	 duty	 suggests	 that	 the	 constitutional	 foundations	 of	 the	
judiciary’s	much	celebrated	power	“to	say	what	the	law	is”	may	be	
much	less	distinctive	than	is	often	assumed.	If	the	judiciary’s	power	





also	 interpret	 the	 law	to	some	extent	 in	order	to	discharge	their	
own	 respective	 constitutional	 duties.11	Roughly	 a	 decade	 before	
the	 Marbury	 decision,	 Alexander	 Hamilton	 described	 the	
President’s	interpretive	authority	in	remarkably	similar	terms	to	
those	Marshall	would	 later	use	 to	 explain	 the	 judiciary’s	power:	
“The	President	is	the	constitutional	Executor	of	the	laws	.	.	.	He	who	





role’	 of	 this	 Court,	 it	 is	 not	 a	 separate,	 free-standing	 role	 at	 all.	We	 perform	 that	 role	
incidentally—by	accident,	as	it	were—when	that	is	necessary	to	resolve	the	dispute	before	











Frisch,	 ed.	2007).	Hamilton’s	defense	of	presidential	 interpretive	authority	 came	 in	 the	
context	 of	 the	 Neutrality	 Crisis	 of	 1793	 and	 President	 Washington’s	 unilateral	
proclamation	of	American	neutrality.	See	FLAHERTY,	supra	note	3,	at	67-73	(discussing	the	
Neutrality	 Controversy).	Washington’s	 proclamation	 followed	 an	 unsuccessful	 effort	 to	







absence	 of	 judicial	 oversight	 of	 certain	 questions	 affecting	 the	
other	 two	 Branches’	 authority	 over	 foreign	 affairs	 is	 neither	
particularly	 aberrational	 nor	 particularly	 disturbing.	 Rather,	 the	
absence	of	judicial	involvement	may	simply	reflect	the	absence	of	
a	 substantive	 entitlement	 conferring	 on	 aggrieved	 litigants	 an	
entitlement	 to	 judicial	 relief.	 	 Alternatively,	 such	 absence	 may	
simply	 reflect	 a	 decision	 by	 the	 affected	 parties	 not	 to	 bring	
whatever	claims	they	might	have	before	a	federal	tribunal.13	
A	 second	 important	 implication	 of	 linking	 judicial	 role	 to	
judicial	duty	is	that	questions	of	“judicial	role”	are	likely	to	hinge	
on	 the	 content	 of	 the	 underlying	 substantive	 law	 governing	 the	
United	States’	relations	with	foreign	nations	and	the	nature	of	the	








over	 time,	 the	 appropriate	 level	 of	 judicial	 involvement	 may	
change	as	well	 for	 reasons	other	 than	a	 refusal	by	 the	 courts	 to	
perform	their	assigned	constitutional	role.	





the	 judiciary’s	proper	“role”	 in	 foreign	affairs	may	have	changed	
because	the	content	of	the	relevant	law	and/or	the	nature	of	the	







115	 COLUM.	 L.	 REV.	 599,	 621-26	 (2015)	 (noting	 that	 a	 party’s	 legal	 entitlement	 to	 sue	








relations	 with	 foreign	 nations.	 And	 to	 compare	 the	 judiciary’s	
“proper	role”	in	foreign	affairs	under	this	framework	to	its	proper	
role	 at	 earlier	 periods	 of	 our	 nation’s	 history	would	 require	 an	
equally	 careful	 doctrine-by-doctrine	 assessment	 of	 what	
governing	law	required	during	those	earlier	periods.	Such	a	review	
is	well	beyond	the	scope	of	the	present	inquiry.		Instead,	this	Part	









in	 background	 principles	 of	 international	 law	 or	 patterns	 of	
international	practice.	A	prominent	example	of	 this	 type	of	 legal	
change	 is	 provided	 by	 the	 demise	 of	 prize	 jurisdiction	 as	 a	
meaningful	source	of	adjudication	during	the	late	nineteenth	and	
early	 twentieth	 centuries.	 Under	 the	 eighteenth-century	
international	 law	 of	 war,	 belligerent	 nations	 possessed	 the	









15.	 David	 J.	 Bederman,	The	 Feigned	 Demise	 of	 Prize,	 9	 EMORY	 INT’L	 L.	 REV.	 31,	 33	




in	 the	 workability	 of	 this	 system	 because	 a	 judicial	 decree	 was	
necessary	 to	 give	 the	 claimants—both	 naval	 crewmen	 and	
privateers	 licensed	 by	 the	 belligerent	 state—clear	 legal	 title	 to	
captured	property.16	
Prize	 law	 hinged	 on	 an	 elaborate	 system	 of	 widely	 shared	
international	 law	 principles	 that	 had	 been	 carefully	 honed	 by	
courts	 and	 commentators	 over	 the	 course	 of	 centuries. 17	
Adherence	 to	 these	principles	by	courts	of	all	 “civilized”	nations	
allowed	belligerents	and	neutrals	whose	property	was	caught	up	
in	 prize	 proceedings	 to	 attain	 a	measure	 of	 certainty	 regarding	
their	rights	and	obligations18	and	minimized	the	potential	for	naval	
captures	 to	 create	 or	 exacerbate	 international	 conflict. 19	
Conversely,	 the	 failure	of	a	nation	 to	adhere	 to	 the	 international	
law	principles	 that	governed	prize	 cases	 could	not	only	unsettle	
private	commercial	expectations	but	risked	embroiling	the	nation	
in	 international	 conflict—up	 to	 and	 including	 war. 20 	For	 this	
reason,	 attempting	 to	 regularize	 the	 administration	 of	 prize	







only	 a	 natural,	 but	 a	 necessary	 appendage	 to	 the	 power	 of	 war,	 and	 negotiation	 with	
foreign	nations.”).	
17.	 Bederman,	supra	note	15,	at	33.	On	the	background	and	development	of	the	legal	
principles	 governing	 prize	 cases,	 see	 generally	 1	 PHILIP	 C.	 JESSUP	 &	 FRANCIS	 DEAK,	
NEUTRALITY:	ITS	HISTORY,	ECONOMICS,	AND	LAW	(1935).	
18.	 See,	e.g.,	David	A.	Faber,	Justice	Bushrod	Washington	and	the	Age	of	Discovery	in	

















Revolutionary-era	 Confederation	 Congress. 21 	And	 concern	 over	
administration	of	prize	cases	provided	a	significant	impetus	for	the	












prize	 cases, 27 	the	 federal	 courts’	 prize	 jurisdiction	 gave	 those	
 









involving	 enforcement	 of	 U.S.	 revenue	 laws	 and	 criminal	 prosecutions	 arising	 out	 of	
offenses	 on	 the	 high	 seas	 as	 among	 the	 most	 significant	 factors	 driving	 the	 Framers’	
decision	to	confer	admiralty	jurisdiction	on	the	federal	courts).	
23.	 Golove	&	Hulsebosch,	supra	note	20,	at	1003	(identifying	prize	cases	as	“among	
the	 most	 numerous	 and	 important	 types	 of	 cases	 raising	 questions	 under	 the	 law	 of	
nations”	 in	 the	 early	 Republic);	 Ariel	 N.	 Lavinbuk,	 Note,	 Rethinking	 Early	 Judicial	
Involvement	in	Foreign	Affairs:	An	Empirical	Study	of	the	Supreme	Court’s	Docket,	114	YALE	
L.J.	855,	882-83	(2005).	
24 .	 Murray	 v.	 The	 Schooner	 Charming	 Betsy,	 6	 U.S.	 (2	 Cranch)	 64,	 118	 (1804)	
(articulating	a	rule	of	statutory	construction	providing	that	“an	act	of	Congress	ought	never	
to	be	construed	to	violate	the	law	of	nations	if	any	other	possible	construction	remains.”).	
25.	 The	 Schooner	 Exchange	 v.	McFaddon,	 11	 U.S.	 (7	 Cranch)	 116,	 134-35	 (1812)	
(holding	 the	 ships	 of	 national	 sovereigns	 exempt	 from	 the	 jurisdiction	 of	 the	 federal	
courts).	
26.	 The	Prize	Cases,	67	U.S.	(2	Black)	635,	668-71	(1862)	(concluding	that	President	


















This	 shift	 in	 international	 practice	 left	 open	 a	 possible	
continuing	 role	 for	 prize	 law	 as	 a	 mechanism	 for	 adjudicating	
captures	 by	 naval	 officers	 and	 crew. 30 	And	 federal	 courts	
continued	to	hand	down	a	few	significant	prize	decisions	through	
the	 conclusion	 of	 the	 nineteenth	 century. 31 	Indeed,	 prize	 cases	
remain	 a	 formal	 subject	 of	 federal	 district	 courts’	 statutorily	
conferred	jurisdiction	to	this	day.32	But	legal	reforms	of	the	early	
twentieth	 century	 removed	 most	 of	 the	 persisting	 financial	










31.	 Perhaps	most	 famous	was	the	United	States	Supreme	Court’s	1900	decision	 in	
The	Paquete	Habana,	175	U.S.	677	(1900)—a	prize	decision	growing	out	of	the	capture	of	










judiciary’s	 caseload	 by	 the	 middle	 portion	 of	 the	 twentieth	
century.33	
Prize	law’s	demise	has	obvious	implications	for	assessing	the	
judiciary’s	 proper	 “role”	 on	 the	 international	 stage	 under	 a	
conception	 of	 judicial	 role	 that	 prioritizes	 the	 judicial	 duty	 to	
decide	actual	cases	between	adverse	 litigants.	For	one	 thing,	 the	
collapse	of	prize	 jurisdiction	eliminated	a	 significant	 category	of	
litigants	who,	 under	 virtually	 any	 plausible	 doctrinal	 test,	 could	
establish	the	existence	of	a	genuine	“case	or	controversy”	sufficient	
to	confer	standing	on	the	federal	courts.34	And	because	prize	law	















prize	 decision	 reported	 in	 the	 United	 States.”);	 see	 also	 Nicholas	 Parrillo,	 The	 De-




34.	 Cf.	 Summers	v.	Earth	 Island	 Institute,	555	U.S.	488,	493	 (2009)	 (articulating	a	
doctrinal	test	for	standing	that	requires	the	showing	of	an	actual	injury	that	is	concrete	
and	 particularized,	 fairly	 traceable	 to	 the	 defendant’s	 action,	 and	 redressable	 by	 the	
courts).	
35.	 See,	e.g.,	The	Prize	Cases,	67	U.S.	(2	Black)	635,	667-71	(1862)	(considering	the	
lawfulness	 of	 a	 federal	 blockade	 initiated	 without	 a	 formal	 declaration	 of	 war	 by	
Congress);	 The	 Nereide,	 13	 U.S.	 (9	 Cranch)	 388,	 425-27	 (1815)	 (considering	 whether	
neutral	property	carried	on	belligerent	ships	could	lawfully	be	claimed	as	prize).	
36.	 See,	e.g.,	Holtzman	v.	Schlesinger,	484	F.2d	1307	(2d	Cir.	1973)	(concluding	that	
member	 of	 Congress	 lacked	 standing	 to	 challenge	 President’s	 conduct	 of	 military	
operations	 allegedly	 unauthorized	 by	 Congress);	 Smith	 v.	 Obama,	 217	 F.	 Supp.	 3d	 283	





















treaty	 practice	 provide	 a	 possible	 illustration	 of	 this	 second	
phenomenon.	 Though	 treaties	 reflect	 international	 law	
commitments	between	the	United	States	and	foreign	nations,	they	
also	constitute	a	source	of	domestic	law	that	is,	at	least	potentially,	














as	 Federal	 Common	 Law:	 A	 Critique	 of	 the	Modern	 Position,	 110	HARV.	 L.	 REV.	 815,	 827	
(1997)	 (contesting	 the	 view	 that	 federal	 courts	 possess	 a	 general	 power	 to	 apply	
customary	 international	 law	 as	 a	 rule	 of	 decision	 in	 modern	 cases),	with,	 e.g.,	 Harold	







establishes	 the	 type	 of	 legal	 right	 that	 is	 enforceable	 by	 courts.	
Consider,	for	example,	the	1783	Treaty	of	Paris,	which	formalized	
the	end	of	hostilities	with	Great	Britain	and	brought	the	American	
Revolution	 to	 a	 close.42	Certain	 commitments	 in	 that	 document	
undoubtedly	 pledged	 direct	 commitments	 of	 the	 type	 that	were	




by	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 notwithstanding	 a	 conflicting	 Virginia	
statute	in	its	landmark	1796	decision	in	Ware	v.	Hylton.44	But	the	
very	next	article	 in	 that	 treaty	conferred	no	directly	enforceable	
individual	 right,	but	 rather	merely	pledged	 that	Congress	would	
“earnestly	 recommend	 it	 to	 the	 Legislatures	 of	 the	 respective	
States”	that	loyalist	property	confiscated	during	the	Revolution	be	
restored. 45 	Because	 this	 commitment	 could	 be	 discharged	 by	
Congress	through	a	mere	recommendation	to	the	state	legislatures,	
it	 created	 no	 judicially	 enforceable	 entitlement	 that	 could	 be	
asserted	 by	 disappointed	 loyalists	 seeking	 restoration	 of	 their	
confiscated	property.46	
Chief	 Justice	 Marshall’s	 1829	 decision	 in	 Foster	 v.	 Neilson,	
recognized	 a	 similar	 distinction	 between	 what	 that	 decision	
characterized	 as	 commitments	 “address[ed]	 .	 .	 .	 to	 the	 political”	
 
id.	 art.	 III,	 §	2	 (providing	 that	 the	 judicial	 power	 of	 the	United	 States	 “shall	 extend”	 to,	




















principle	 that	 some	 treaty	 commitments	 are	 “self-executing.”	 in	
that	 they	 “automatically	 have	 effect	 as	 domestic	 law.”	 48 	Other	




task	of	distinguishing	 self-executing	 treaty	provisions	 from	non-
self-executing	provisions	involved	primarily	parsing	the	relevant	
treaty	language	along	with	whatever	evidence	of	extrinsic	intent	of	
the	 treaty’s	 framers	 was	 deemed	 admissible. 50 	This	 task	 was	
facilitated	to	a	significant	extent	by	the	predominance	of	bilateral	
treaties	as	the	near-exclusive	paradigm	of	US	treaty-making	during	
the	 early	 nineteenth	 century. 51 	Though	 hardly	 free	 from	
difficulties,52	the	discernment	of	presumed	intent	from	a	document	
produced	through	bilateral	negotiations	between	contracting	state	
parties	 involved	 fewer	 interpretive	 challenges	 than	 those	 that	
typically	 attend	 the	 multilateral	 paradigm	 that	 had	 come	 to	





















language	 version	 of	 the	 treaty,	 which	 lent	 additional	 credence	 to	 the	 self-execution	
interpretation.	United	States	v.	Percheman,	32	U.S.	(7	Pet.)	51,	88–89	(1833).	
53.	 See,	e.g.,	Kevin	C.	Kennedy,	Conditional	Approval	of	Treaties	by	the	U.S.	Senate,	19	





rarely	 speak	with	 clarity	 to	 the	 precise	modes	 in	which	 nations	
should	 go	 about	 carrying	 into	 execution	 their	 treaty	
commitments.54	
The	 mid-twentieth-century	 ascendance	 of	 multilateral	




contracting	 parties. 55 	The	 growing	 acceptance	 of	 treaty	
reservations	 on	 the	 international	 plane	 in	 the	 mid-twentieth	
century	 coincided	 with	 a	 movement	 by	 political	 forces	 in	 the	
United	States—led	by	Ohio	Senator	 Joseph	Bricker—to	 limit	 the	
domestic	 legal	 effect	 of	 multilateral	 human	 rights	 treaties. 56	
Though	Bricker	and	his	allies	initially	mobilized	behind	a	proposed	
constitutional	amendment	that	would	limit	treaties’	self-executing	
effect	 as	 a	 general	 matter,	 the	 energies	 associated	 with	 their	
movement	were	eventually	channeled	toward	efforts	to	limit	the	
domestic	legal	effect	of	multilateral	human	rights	treaties	through	
treaty	 reservations. 57 	Throughout	 the	 later	 portion	 of	 the	
twentieth	century,	the	Senate	conditioned	its	“advice	and	consent”	
to	multiple	multilateral	 human	 rights	 treaties	 on	 “reservations,”	
“understandings,”	 or	 “declarations”	 purporting	 to	 limit	 those	
treaties’	domestic	legal	effect.58	
 






away	 from	 the	 “unanimity	 rule”	 in	 state	 practice,	 which	 allowed	 only	 those	 state	












Courts	 that	 have	 considered	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 the	
Constitution	 empowers	 the	 Senate	 to	 condition	 its	 assent	 to	
treaties	in	this	manner—and	thereby	limit	their	domestic	status	as	
judicially	 enforceable	 “supreme	Law”—have	generally	held	 such	
reservations	 permissible.59	But	 the	 question	 is	 hardly	 free	 from	
controversy. 60 	And	 even	 apart	 from	 such	 express	 reservations,	
questions	 may	 frequently	 arise	 regarding	 the	 proper	
interpretation	 of	 multilateral	 treaty	 commitments	 that	 might	





twentieth	 century—both	 at	 the	 international	 level	 and	 in	 the	
practices	of	the	US	political	branches—may	render	the	judiciary’s	
late	eighteenth	and	early	nineteenth	century	treaty	jurisprudence	
a	 potentially	 inapposite	 guide	 for	modern	 treaty	 interpretation.	
Professor	 Flaherty	 demonstrates	 a	 robust	 commitment	 among	
jurists	in	the	early	republic	to	enforcing	treaties	as	domestic	law	
on	 the	 same	 plane	 as	 federal	 statutes. 62 	But	 even	 that	 early	
jurisprudence	 reflected	 a	 recognition	 that	 some	 treaty	
commitments	might	be	directed	to	institutions	other	than	courts.63	
To	 the	 extent	 modern	 treaty-makers	 have	 chosen	 to	 rely	 more	
extensively	 on	 such	 non-judicially	 enforceable	 commitments—
whether	 through	 explicit	 treaty	 language,	 express	 treaty	
reservations,	or	the	choice	of	vague	and	aspirational	pledges	rather	
 
59.	 See,	e.g.,	Ramsey,	 supra	 note	45,	 at	1659;	 see	also	 Igartúa-de	 la	Rosa	v.	United	


















merely	 reflect	 adherence	 to	 the	 design	 choice	 of	 the	





judiciary’s	proper	 “role”	 in	 foreign	affairs	controversies	 involves	
the	body	of	 legal	 rules,	 principles,	 presumptions,	 and	 guidelines	
through	which	the	judiciary	identifies	the	linguistic	content	of	legal	
instruments	and	translates	 that	 language	 into	authoritative	 legal	
commands—what	William	Baude	and	Stephen	Sachs	have	termed	
the	 “law	 of	 interpretation.” 66 	Though	 ubiquitous	 in	 our	 legal	
practices,	 the	 precise	 legal	 and	 jurisprudential	 status	 of	 such	
interpretive	 rules	 and	 principles	 has	 long	 been	 ambiguous	 and	
contestable. 67 	But	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 deny	 that	 such	 interpretive	
principles	have	played	a	significant	role	in	shaping	the	judiciary’s	
engagement	with	foreign	affairs	controversies.68	
The	 ambiguity	 surrounding	 the	 precise	 legal	 status	 and	
legitimacy	 of	 the	 judiciary’s	 interpretive	 rules	 is	 matched	 by	 a	
similar	 ambiguity	 surrounding	 the	 mechanisms	 through	 which	
 






67 .	 Id.	 at	 1085	 (observing	 that	 recent	 debates	 have	 overlooked	 the	 role	 of	 legal	
principles	by	assuming	“that	legal	interpretation	is	just	regular	interpretation,	applied	to	
legal	 texts”);	but	 cf.	Ethan	 J.	 Leib	&	Michael	 Serota,	The	 Costs	 of	 Consensus	 in	 Statutory	




extent	possible);	 id.	 at	84–85	(discussing	 the	“last-in-time”	rule	 for	addressing	conflicts	
between	the	requirements	between	federal	statutes	and	federal	treaties);	 id.	at	128–29,		





scholars	 take	 the	 position	 that	 the	 interpretation	 of	 legal	 texts	
should	always	be	guided	by	the	interpretive	rules	and	maxims	that	
were	widely	accepted	at	the	time	a	particular	legal	instrument	was	
enacted. 69 	Others	 take	 the	 position	 that	 interpretive	 rules	 and	
practices	may	permissibly	change	over	time	in	ways	that	diverge	
from	 those	 that	 might	 have	 been	 anticipated	 by	 the	 initial	
enactors.70	But	even	under	 the	more	 restrictive	view	 that	would	
limit	interpretive	principles	to	those	that	were	in	place	at	the	time	
of	enactment,	 changes	 in	background	conditions	or	assumptions	
may	 force	 officials	 to	 adapt	 the	 applicable	 interpretive	 rules	 to	
address	the	new	state	of	affairs.71	
The	 presumption	 against	 extraterritorial	 application	 of	




mere	 corollary	 of	 the	 assumedly	 limited	 scope	 of	 prescriptive	
jurisdiction	 under	 international	 law.	 As	 Justice	 Joseph	 Story	
explained	in	his	1824	decision	in	The	Apollon—a	canonical	early	
citation	 for	 the	 presumption	 against	 extraterritoriality—“[t]he	





69.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Baude	&	 Sachs,	 supra	 note	 66,	 at	 1132–36	 (arguing	 that	 interpretive	
rules	that	“determine	the	legal	content	of	a	written	instrument	upon	its	adoption”	should	
be	held	stable	over	time).	





589–90	 (2003)	 (observing	 that	 “the	 criteria	 for	 the	 proper	 application	 of	 some	 of	 the	
Constitution’s	 words	 and	 phrases”	 were	 likely	 “not	 fully	 specified	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	








As	 the	 foremost	 American	 expert	 on	 international	 law	
principles	governing	the	conflict	of	multiple	sovereigns’	laws,	and	
the	 author	 of	 the	 treatise	 that	 established	 conflict	 of	 laws	 as	 a	
distinctive	 field	 of	 legal	 studies, 75 	Story	 was	 decidedly	 well	
positioned	to	opine	on	this	issue.	In	view	of	the	strongly	territorial	
conception	 of	 sovereign	 jurisdiction	 that	 predominated	 in	 late	
eighteenth	 and	 early	 nineteenth-century	 international	 law,76	the	
presumption	against	extraterritoriality	could	be	seen	as	little	more	
than	 a	 specific	 instantiation	 of	 the	 equally	 venerable	 Charming	
Betsy	 canon—i.e.,	 the	 principle	 that	 a	 statute	 should	 not	 be	
construed	to	violate	an	established	norm	of	international	law	if	an	
alternative	 interpretation	 were	 available. 77 	Like	 all	 rules	 of	
international	 law,	 the	 operative	 judicial	 presumption	 was	 that	
Congress	could	override	this	directive	through	a	sufficiently	clear	
expression	 of	 statutory	 intent.78	And	 throughout	 the	 nineteenth	
century,	 the	 predominant	 question	 surrounding	 the	




DOMESTIC,	 IN	 REGARD	 TO	 CONTRACTS,	 RIGHTS,	 AND	 REMEDIES,	 AND	 ESPECIALLY	 IN	 REGARD	 TO	





76 .	 See,	 e.g.,	 J.	 Andrew	 Kent,	 A	 Textual	 and	 Historical	 Case	 Against	 a	 Global	
Constitution,	 95	GEO.	 L.J.	 463,	 492	 (2007)	 (“It	 is	 undoubtedly	 true	 that	 eighteenth-	 and	
nineteenth-century	legal	thought	was	heavily	territorial.	Broadly	speaking,	a	nation’s	law	
was	viewed	as	 territorially	 limited,	meaning	 that	neither	 its	proscriptive	power	nor	 its	
protections	were	thought	to	operate	extraterritorially.”).	
77.	 See,	 e.g.,	 William	 S.	 Dodge,	 Understanding	 the	 Presumption	 Against	
Extraterritoriality,	 16	 BERKELEY	 J.	 INT’L	 L.	 85,	 114	 (1998)	 (describing	 the	 nineteenth	











Beginning	 in	 the	 early	 twentieth	 century,	 however,	 the	
international	 law	 framework	 undergirding	 the	 presumption	
against	 extraterritoriality	 began	 to	 shift	 significantly.	 At	 the	
international	 level,	 the	 assumption	 of	 exclusively	 territorial	
national	 jurisdiction	 began	 to	 yield	 to	 a	 much	 more	 expansive	
conception	 of	 state	 authority. 80 	At	 around	 the	 same	 time,	 the	
predominant	 assumption	 of	 territoriality	 as	 the	 governing	
framework	 for	 determining	 the	 scope	 of	 sovereign	 lawmaking	
authority	within	the	United	States	came	under	withering	attack	by	
“Legal	 Realist”	 critics. 81 	By	 the	 later	 portion	 of	 the	 twentieth	
century,	 the	strictly	 territorial	conception	of	sovereign	authority	
that	had	motivated	the	initial	adoption	of	the	presumption	against	












not	 extend	 the	application	of	 their	 laws	and	 the	 jurisdiction	of	 their	 courts	 to	persons,	
property	and	acts	outside	their	 territory,”	but	rather,	subject	 to	specific	exceptions,	 left	
each	state	free	“to	adopt	the	principle	which	it	regards	as	best	and	most	suitable.”	The	Case	
of	the	S.S.	Lotus	(Fr.	v.	Turk.),	Judgment,	1927	P.C.I.J.	(ser.	A)	10,	at	19	(Sept	7);	see	also,	
e.g.,	 Dodge,	 supra	 note	 77,	 at	 114	 (pointing	 to	 the	 Lotus	 decision	 as	 support	 for	 the	
proposition	 that	 “[i]nternational	 law	 provides	 no	 basis	 for	 the	 presumption	 against	
extraterritoriality	today”).	
81.	 See	Kermit	Roosevelt,	III,	The	Myth	of	Choice	of	Law:	Rethinking	Conflicts,	97	MICH.	
L.	REV.	2448,	2458–61	(1999)	(discussing	 the	Legal	Realist	 critique	of	 the	predominant	
territorialist	conception	of	conflicts);	cf.	Dodge,	supra	note	77,	at	114-15	(discussing	the	




of	 national	 laws”	 and	 that	 “[a]n	 increasingly	 interdependent	 and	 globalized	world	 has	
rendered	strict	territorial	limits	on	jurisdiction	increasingly	unworkable”);	Nelson,	supra	
note	75,	at	679–93	(discussing	the	“Conflicts	Revolution”	of	the	1960’s	and	1970’s	during	




regarding	 how	 to	 respond	 to	 this	 change.	 One	 conceptually	
available	 response	may	 have	 been	 to	 abandon	 the	 presumption	
and	instead	interpret	federal	statutes	to	reach	the	full	extent	of	the	
nation’s	 permissible	 jurisdiction	 under	 international	 law. 83 	But	
this	was	not	the	only	option	available	to	the	courts.	One	that	the	
Supreme	 Court	 actively	 embraced, 84 	was	 that	 the	 presumption	
against	 extraterritoriality	 should	 be	 adhered	 to	 as	 part	 of	 the	





Replacing	 that	 presumption	 with	 an	 alternative	 presumption	
threatened	 to	 unsettle	 the	 expectations	 underlying	 numerous	
earlier-adopted	 federal	 statutes. 86 	Nor	 was	 it	 obvious	 that	 a	
different	 rule	 of	 construction	 should	 apply	 to	 statutes	 adopted	
after	the	shift	in	understanding	regarding	the	territorial	limits	of	
national	 legislation.	 Given	 the	 longstanding	 adherence	 to	 the	
presumption	against	extraterritoriality,	both	Congress	and	 those	
subject	 to	 its	 enactments	 might	 reasonably	 assume	 that	 the	
presumption	would	continue	to	apply	in	the	manner	it	had	unless	
 
83.	 See,	 e.g.,	 John	H.	 Knox,	A	Presumption	 Against	 Extrajurisdictionality,	 104	AM.	 J.	
INT’L	L.	351	(2010)	(urging	a	presumption	that	federal	statutes	be	read	to	extend	to	the	
permissible	 scope	 of	 U.S.	 jurisdiction	 under	 international	 law);	 cf.	 Zachary	 R.	 Clopton,	
Replacing	 the	 Presumption	 Against	 Extraterritoriality,	 94	 B.U.	 L.	 REV.	 1,	 24–35	 (2014)	
(arguing	 that	 international	 law	 should	 define	 the	 presumptive	 scope	 of	 civil,	 but	 not	
criminal,	federal	statutes).	
84.	 See	EEOC	v.	Arabian	Am.	Oil	Co.	(Aramco),	499	U.S.	244,	248	(1991)	(citing	Foley	
Bros.,	 Inc.	 v.	 Filardo,	 336	 U.S.	 281,	 285	 (1949))(““[L]egislation	 of	 Congress,	 unless	 a	
contrary	 intent	appears,	 is	meant	 to	apply	only	within	 the	 territorial	 jurisdiction	of	 the	
United	States.”).	
85.	 See	The	Appollon,	22	U.S.	(9	Wheat.)	362,	370-72	(1824).	
86.	 Similar	 interpretive	challenges	attend	other	circumstances	 in	which	courts	are	
called	upon	 to	determine	 the	 jurisdictional	 reach	of	 statutes	 that	were	adopted	against	
background	legal	assumptions	that	have	changed	over	time.	Compare,	e.g.,	Archer	Daniels	
Midland	Co.	v.	Seven	Up	Bottling	Co.,	746	So.	2d	966	(1999)	(interpreting	a	state	antitrust	
















extraterritoriality.	 On	 one	 understanding,	 it	 could	 be	 seen	 as	 a	
mechanism	 for	 limiting	 Congressional	 enactments	 to	 the	
presumedly	 limited	 scope	 of	 the	 federal	 government’s	
jurisdictional	authority	under	international	law.	As	so	understood,	
the	 presumption	 might	 reasonably	 be	 seen	 as	 flexible	 and	
adaptable	such	that	the	presumption	itself	should	adapt	to	mirror	
any	 corresponding	 changes	 in	 background	 principles	 of	
international	law.	Alternatively,	the	presumption	could	be	seen	as	
a	mechanism	for	discerning	the	actual	intent	of	Congress	by	placing	
the	 interpretive	 burden	 on	 proponents	 of	 extraterritorial	




alternative	paths	or	 the	path	 that	 the	 Supreme	Court	 eventually	
settled	 on—i.e.,	 adhering	 to	 a	 reasonably	 strong	 presumption	
against	 statutory	 extraterritoriality—were	 affirmatively	
compelled	by	a	proper	understanding	of	“judicial	duty.”	Rather,	it	
may	be	the	case	that	the	judiciary	sometimes	possesses	a	degree	of	
discretion	 in	 choosing	 from	 among	 various	 equally	 permissible	
mechanisms	of	discharging	 its	 judicial	duty	“to	say	what	the	 law	
is.”88	And	while	the	Supreme	Court	might	reasonably	be	criticized	
for	 having	 chosen	 the	 “wrong”	 option	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	
 
87.	 See	1	U.S.C.	§	1	(setting	forth	a	limited	set	of	interpretive	prescriptions	relating	to	
federal	 statutory	 language	 addressing	 “numbers,	 gender,	 and	 so	 forth”);	 see	 also,	 e.g.,	
Nicholas	Quinn	Rosenkranz,	Federal	Rules	of	Statutory	 Interpretation,	115	HARV.	L.	REV.	








desirable	 public	 policy, 89 	such	 policy-based	 critiques	 differ	 in	
meaningful	respects	from	a	charge	that	the	courts	have	failed	in	or	
abdicated	their	duty	to	follow	applicable	law.	In	circumstances	like	
those	 that	 confronted	 the	 judiciary	 during	 the	 transition	 of	 the	
extraterritoriality	 presumption	 from	 a	 corollary	 of	 international	
law	 into	 a	 more	 conventional	 “substantive”	 canon	 of	 statutory	




Before	 concluding,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 emphasize	 a	 few	
significant	caveats	that	should	clarify	and	circumscribe	the	claims	
being	 made	 in	 this	 Essay.	 The	 primary	 thrust	 of	 this	 Essay	 is	
conceptual	rather	than	empirical.	This	Essay	does	not	stake	out	any	















change	on	 the	 judiciary’s	 proper	 role,	 this	Essay	has	 focused	on	
 














of	 constitutional	 interpretation. 91 	For	 those	 who	 view	 the	
Constitution	 as	 a	 set	 of	 fixed	 directives	 that	 may	 only	 be	
legitimately	 altered	 through	 the	Article	V	 amendment	process,92	
the	passage	of	time	may	be	much	less	significant	for	comparing	the	
appropriate	role	of	the	judiciary	at	different	points	in	our	history	
because	 there	 have	 been	 only	 a	 small	 number	 of	 formal	
amendments,	virtually	none	of	which	touch	in	a	meaningful	way	on	
the	 allocation	 of	 foreign	 affairs	 powers. 93 	But	 for	 those	 whose	
preferred	 theory	 of	 constitutional	 interpretation	 acknowledges	
the	 permissibility	 of	 some	 forms	 of	 legitimate,	 extratextual	
constitutional	 change, 94 	the	 passage	 of	 time	 may	 open	 up	
interpretive	 challenges	 similar	 to	 those	 considered	 in	 this	Essay	
because	the	governing	rules	of	constitutional	law	might	be	seen	as	
meaningfully	different	at	different	points	in	our	history.95	
Finally,	 though	 this	 Essay	 has	 focused	 on	 assessing	 the	
judiciary’s	proper	“role”	from	the	perspective	of	judicial	duty,	this	









constitutional	 rule	 to	 be	 supported	 by	 a	 pedigree	 tracing	 back	 to	 either	 the	 original	
Constitution	of	1787	or	a	validly	enacted	amendment).	
93.	 Even	theories	that	assume	a	fixed	and	unchanging	constitutional	meaning	may	
face	challenges	 in	determining	how	that	meaning	applies	 to	new	facts	or	 interacts	with	
changes	in	non-constitutional	legal	rules.	See	Nelson,	supra	note	71,	at	589–98	(discussing	
such	challenges).	
94 .	 See,	 e.g.,	 Youngstown	 Sheet	 &	 Tube	 Co.	 v.	 Sawyer,	 343	 U.S.	 579,	 610	 (1952)	
(Frankfurter,	 J.,	 concurring)	 (“It	 is	 an	 inadmissibly	 narrow	 conception	 of	 American	
constitutional	law	to	confine	it	to	the	words	of	the	Constitution	and	to	disregard	the	gloss	
which	life	has	written	upon	them”).	
95 .	 Cf.	 Curtis	 A.	 Bradley	 &	 Neil	 S.	 Siegel,	After	 Recess:	 Historical	 Practice,	 Textual	
Ambiguity,	and	Constitutional	Adverse	Possession,	2014	SUP.	CT.	REV.	1,	51-65	(considering	
an	“adverse	possession”	analogy	for	constitutional	meaning	under	which	certain	forms	of	





affairs	as	a	 function	of	 their	more	 fundamental	duty	to	 interpret	
and	apply	the	governing	law	in	cases	properly	brought	within	their	
jurisdiction.96	But	such	a	constrained	view	of	judicial	role	may	not	





evidence	 and	 arguments—render	 the	 courts	 particularly	
appropriate	or	desirable	forums	for	addressing	questions	touching	
on	foreign	relations,97	calls	for	a	more	significant	practical	role	for	
the	 courts	 might	 plausibly	 be	 addressed	 to	 not	 only	 the	 courts	
themselves	 but	 to	 other	 institutions,	 such	 as	 the	 President	 and	
Congress.	These	other	 institutional	 actors,	 unlike	 the	 courts,	 are	
not	 limited	 to	 interpreting	 and	 applying	 the	 preexisting	 law	 in	
cases	 properly	 brought	 within	 their	 jurisdiction.	 Rather,	 these	
other	institutions	have	an	explicit	and	acknowledged	policymaking	
role	 in	 the	 constitutional	 framework	 and	 are	 thus	 much	 less	
inhibited	 in	 their	 ability	 to	 explicitly	 weigh	 and	 act	 on	 purely	
functionalist	considerations.98	
And	 the	 President	 and	 Congress,	 in	 the	 exercise	 of	 their	
respective	 constitutional	 powers, 99 	have	 a	 significant	 degree	 of	
control	 over	 the	 substantive	 legal	 entitlements	 that	 might	 be	
brought	before	the	courts,	thereby	shaping	to	a	meaningful	extent	










99.	 See	U.S.	 Const.	 art.	 I,	 §	8	 (empowering	 Congress	 to	 legislate	with	 respect	 to	 a	
variety	of	enumerated	subjects	and	to	make	laws	“necessary	and	proper	for	carrying	into	
execution”	its	own	powers	as	well	as	“all	other	powers	vested	.	.	.		in	the	Government	of	the	
United	 States,	 or	 in	 any	 Department	 or	 Officer	 thereof”);	 U.S.	 Const.,	 art.	 II,	 §	2	
(empowering	the	President,	by	and	with	 the	advice	and	consent	of	 the	Senate,	 to	make	






(and	 the	consequent	 failure	of	 courts	 to	enforce	statutory	 rights	
abroad),	Congress	can	override	the	presumption—either	globally	
or	within	the	context	of	specific	statutes.100	Likewise,	 if	Congress	




execution	or	 (more	 likely)	 by	 adopting	 implementing	 legislation	
conferring	 explicit	 rights	 under	 domestic	 law	 that	 match	 the	
nation’s	international	treaty	commitments.101	
And	 while	 it	 seems	 deeply	 improbable	 that	 policymakers	
would	 have	 either	 the	 incentive	 or	 capacity	 to	 restore	 prize	
jurisdiction	 to	 its	 once	 central	 role	 in	 the	 transnational	 legal	
system,	the	success	of	prize	courts	in	providing	a	relatively	stable	
system	of	international	governance	implemented	through	national	
courts	 might	 plausibly	 provide	 a	 model	 for	 future	 directions	 in	
international	 law. 102 	Efforts	 along	 these	 lines	 may	 already	 be	
emerging	at	 the	 international	 level.103	To	 the	extent	 the	political	
branches	 are	 interested	 in	 integrating	 the	 federal	 judiciary	 into	
this	 emerging	 framework	of	 international	 governance,	 they	may	
have	a	significant	capacity	to	empower	the	courts	in	this	way.	
CONCLUSION	
We	 are	 all,	 of	 course,	 familiar	 with	 Chief	 Justice	Marshall’s	
famous	declaration	that	“[i]t	is	emphatically	the	province	and	duty	










surely	does),	 but,	 rather,	 as	 a	paradigm	 for	 the	 incremental	development	of	 customary	
international	law.”).	
103.	 See,	e.g.,	FLAHERTY,	supra	note	3,	at	147-48	(discussing	the	emergence	in	recent	







the	 judiciary’s	 role	 might	 plausibly	 change	 over	 time	 due	 to	
changes	 in	background	principles	of	 governing	 law.	 It	 is	 at	 least	
conceivable	 that	 the	 content	 of	 the	 underlying	 law	 has,	 in	 fact,	
changed	in	ways	that	render	the	judiciary’s	role	in	modern	foreign	
affairs	 controversies	 less	 significant	 than	 it	 may	 have	 been	 in	
earlier	 eras.	 But	 even	 accepting	 this	 possibility,	 there	 is	 every	
reason	to	expect	that	background	legal	principles	will	continue	to	
change	and	evolve	in	new	ways.		And	some	of	those	changes	may	
have	the	tendency	to	magnify,	rather	than	diminish,	the	judiciary’s	
role	in	foreign	affairs.	Professor	Flaherty	has	given	us	a	great	deal	
to	think	about	as	we	look	back	over	the	changes	that	have	already	
taken	place,	and	ahead	at	the	changes	that	are	yet	to	come.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
1262	 FORDHAM	INTERNATIONAL	LAW	JOURNAL	 [Vol.	43:5	
	
	
